PROLIFERATION IN THE NUMBER OF PEACE OPERATIONS DEPLOYED TO AFRICA

Since 1999 there has been a proliferation in the number of peace operations deployed to Africa. The majority of these peace operations have been deployed into situations where there is little peace to keep and to situations where belligerents are actively targeting civilians. The changing security environment and the changing expectations regarding the capacities and roles of peace operations in securing a lasting peace has catalysed a substantial overhaul of peace and security architectures in the African continent.

The African Union (AU) and its sub regional counterpart, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) shifted its normative perspective and operational directives away from the principle of non-interference towards a doctrine of non-indifference that includes the Protection of Civilians (POC), and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Accordingly, the AU and ECOWAS undertook initiatives to reform their peace and security architectures to: (1) transition conflicts and governments to stability and peace, and (2) to prevent and respond to violence against civilians. However, questions remain as to whether or not these ambitious reforms have led to improvements in either the deployment process or the effectiveness of these operations in preventing and responding to atrocity crimes against civilians.

The AU may have incorporated the POC norm into its legal manifestations but this chapter argues that the AU has not effectively galvanized protection at the operational level. If not resolved, the AU will continue to rely on external assistance from the United Nations (UN) or coalitions of states—a troubling trend for African regional peacekeeping that could have serious implications for the realisation of “African solutions to African problems.”

Introduction

Over the last century, violence in Africa has threatened the lives of countless civilians. By the end of the 20th Century, the continent was experiencing a surge in the number and scope of armed conflicts, including a genocide in Rwanda, two civil wars in Liberia, state collapse in Somalia and protracted conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Darfur, Sudan, South Sudan, Burundi, Mali and the Central African Republic, among others. These conflicts, along with changing boundaries and restructuring of governments made it difficult for African leaders to manage peace and security.

The potpourri of today’s complex ethnic, political and religious intra state conflicts in Mali, Somalia, the Central African Republic South Sudan and others has kept Africa at the epicentre of global peacekeeping. As of April 2014, seven of the 16 peace operations worldwide were deployed to Africa (United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations), with an excess of 87,442 total personnel as of April 2014 (Lotze 2013). The African Union (AU) has mandated roughly 40,641 military and civilian personnel to peace operations at the end of 2013 (AU figures not available for 2014), with an additional 30,424 contributing to the joint AU-UN mission in Darfur (UNAMID). This is the highest number of African peacekeepers deployed since the formation of the AU in 2002. With regards to future operations, the AU shows no signs of slowing down. In fact, since 2003, the AU has increased the speed of its missions in a concerted effort to operationalize AU’s principles of non-indifference. On a practical level, this means the AU has already deployed more than 40,000 peacekeepers to Burundi, the Comoros, Darfur, Somalia, the Central African Republic and Mali.

A New African Security Paradigm

The African Union’s predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adhered to a strict philosophy of non-interference in the internal affairs of its member states, meaning that leaders did not get involved, even if a neighboring state was in conflict. This prevailing posture of non-interference combined with a massive surge in the number and scope of conflicts at the end of the 1990s necessitated a peace and security regime; one that would be capable of deploying robust responses to protect human rights and mitigate future mass atrocities.

In response to the atrocities unfolding around the continent, African leaders recognised a need to craft new policies to better address insecurity. By the end of the 20th Century a proliferation of peace operations were deployed to the continent—many into situations where there was little peace to keep and where belligerents were actively targeting civilians. Because international responses to these crises were often slow, many regional actors such as the Economic Community of African States (ECOWAS) took matters into their own hands to try to plug the widening security gap. Perhaps the most notable example of a robust regional response was the deployment of the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) to Liberia when Charles Taylor’s rebellion caused violence and displacement that was spilling over to other parts of the ECOWAS region. Nevertheless, despite the fact that ECOMOG saved the lives of tens of thousands of civilians, it was plagued by accusations of ineffectiveness, corruption and human rights abuses. This evolving climate of insecurity necessitated a substantial overhaul of African peace and security architectures. Coinciding with the creation of the new African Union (AU) in 2002, the development of international legal norms such as the Protection of Civilians (POC) and the Responsibility to Protect (Evans, Annan et al) led to the gradual paradigm shift in African politics from a culture of sovereignty towards a culture of concern over human security. These changes reinforced the concept that peace and security, human rights, and good governance were inextricably linked to economic development and were therefore essential to the new African political narrative.

To this end, African leaders have gradually shifted away from a strict adherence to the policy of non-interference towards a doctrine of non-indifference that incorporated POC and R2P. Accordingly, the AU and its five sub-regions have each undertaken initiatives to reform their peace and security architectures to: (1) transition conflicts and governments to stability and peace, and (2) to prevent and respond to violence against civilians Interestingly, efforts to overhaul AU and ECOWAS peace and security architectures coincided with a surge in demand for peacekeepers in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, and others. (UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2005). Efforts by African governments to overhaul existing institutions and to build new structures for peace operations while also dealing with complex international and civil conflicts was like trying to build a fire brigade while the neighborhood burns. This chapter examines regional (AU) and sub regional (ECOWAS) peacekeeping shortcomings to prevent and responding to violence against civilians. Specifically, it examines each institutions’ authority, willingness, and capacity to protect civilians from atrocity crimes—a particularly timely query as the number, scope, and complexity of peace operations in Africa has grown incrementally as new conflicts arise in South Sudan, the Central African Republic (CAR), and Mali along with protracted conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, and Somalia. Now more than ever, the debate over who has the authority, willingness, and capacity to protect civilians from atrocity crimes is of critical importance. As UN peacekeeping capacity becomes increasingly overstretched, it will be critical to develop regional and sub regional capacities to protect civilians. ECOWAS’ in-depth experience intervening to protect civilians makes them a noteworthy case study.

Operationalising African Peace and Security Paradigms

The failure to protect civilians in the 1990s was the catalyst to a more in-depth, widespread attention to the protection of civilians in UN peace operations, which led to an assortment of new mandates, policy statements, and planning efforts to mainstream protection into peace operations, particularly in Africa.

While the concept of the Protection of Civilians concept first came to the fore in 1999 with UN Security Council Resolution 1265, a deeper attention to the concept took root after 2008 when the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) developed the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (also known as the ‘Capstone Doctrine’) to outline more specific peacekeeping guidance for missions. The Capstone Doctrine encouraged more scholarship on peacekeeping guidance, in fact, a great deal of scholarly literature and external policy studies were produced between 2007 and 2010 to examine peacekeeping efficacy and the Protection of Civilians.

Whilst attention to POC clearly gained traction at the UN, progress to develop policies, and guidance for the Protection of Civilians at the AU has been markedly slower. At the institutional level, the AU made a strong and clear commitment to human security as demonstrated in Article 4(h) of its Constitutive Act, which stresses the AU’s right to intervene in crisis situations (African Union Constitutive Act, 2000). However, normative frameworks and political aspirations and statements have not translated into swift, effective operational capacity in AU peace operations in the field and there remains a significant gap between guidance and the AU’s capacity to carry out effective missions to protect civilians from violence.

Establishing an African Standby Force (ASF)

Outrage over the atrocities of the 1990s—specifically international outcry over the genocide in Rwanda—in conjunction with the introduction of the R2P norm in 2001 and the transition from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the African Union (AU) in 2002 led to calls for more effective peacekeeping models for Africa. Thus, in May 2003, African Chiefs of Defence and Security (ACDS) adopted a policy framework on the establishment of an African Standby Force (ASF) (African Union Roadmap, 2005) The proposals contained in the framework were used as a basis for a protocol to establish the ASF and a Peace and Security Council (PSC) for strategic decision-making at the ASF level. African leaders adopted the protocol in December 2003. However, neither the ASF nor the five sub-regional forces, described below, are considered ‘standing armies.’ Like the UN, ASF forces are made up of contingents from force contributing member states, which can be called upon by the PSC as needed. (African Union March 2005) To understand the evolution of peace and security in Africa, it is important to understand the interworking of the five subregions that make up the African Union. These five regional entities are responsible for implementing the peace and security mandate of the African Union at the sub-regional level and link to the broader African Peace and Security Architecture. Accordingly, the ASF provides for five standby brigade level forces, one from each sub-region: the East African Standby Force (EASF) in the East, the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) in the West, the North African Regional Capability (NARC) in the North, the SADC Standby Force (SSF) and the Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force (FOMAC or ECCAS) in Central Africa. These five sub-regions provide the building blocks of the larger continental-wide African Standby Force.

Effective command and control of the ASF requires collaborative and integrated force command, control, communication and information systems (C3IS). In the March 2005, the AU adopted the document entitled “Roadmap for the Operationalization of the African Standby Force.” The first Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF, negotiated between 2003 and 2005, established a strategic level management capacity for the ASF and outlined that each sub-region would deliver a brigade-sized unit. Perhaps more importantly, Roadmap I sought to unite the sub regions under a common objective to stop genocide and mass violence. Accordingly, Roadmap I emphasized developing military components and perhaps most importantly, sought to improve vertical and horizontal relationships between the five sub-regions and the AU in order to fix interoperability gaps. Roadmap II, adopted in 2008, emphasised creating a mission headquarters that could support a stand-alone regional peacekeeping mission with a UN Chapter VI style preventative deployment mandate, that is, a mandate that focused on monitoring existing peace rather than using force. Furthermore, Roadmap II called for a more streamlined mandate-creation process, improved communications and intelligence gathering, and a greater emphasis on improving strategic lift capability and other logistics. Perhaps more importantly, Roadmap II called for stronger civilian and police components—the AU’s first steps towards a multi-dimensional force. It is important to note here that military and civilian interoperability was a prerequisite for receiving international donor support. For example, the United States and France supported military aspects of the ASF while Canada and Germany provided support for building civilian personnel and police capacity. At the time of writing, Roadmap III is underway, It highlights two areas of critical importance. The first is finalizing the Rapid Deployment Capacity (RDC) component of the ASF and the second is streamlining the Protection of Civilians into all future AU operations.

The African Standby Force: Mission Scenarios and Lessons from the Field

When designing the African Standby Force (ASF) the AU took note of the fact that contemporary conflicts produce diverse types of violence and mass atrocity crimes. Accordingly, the AU created six mission scenarios encapsulating six levels of violent conflict and the anticipated responses to each scenario:

Scenario 1: AU/regional military advice to a political mission;

Scenario 2: AU/regional observer mission co-deployed with a UN mission;

Scenario 3: Standalone AU/regional observer mission;

Scenario 4: AU/regional peacekeeping force for Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions (and peacebuilding);

Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex multidimensional peacekeeping missions, including those involving low-level spoilers;

Scenario 6: AU emergency intervention, for instance in the case of genocide, when no other help is available.

In 2010, the AU mandated each of the five sub-regions to conduct training workshops to address the challenges and progress of overall force development. However, it remains to be seen, just how effective these workshops have been. To date, there has been limited public information on the outcomes of these ASF training exercises. In the context of preventing mass atrocity crimes, Scenario 6 is the most critical. However, Scenario 6 is also the least developed of the ASF scenario capacities. Establishing the ASF as a crucial and effective player in the prevention of atrocity crimes requires field-testing so that the ASF can meet contemporary standards.

One exercise that took place early on in the development of the African Standby Force was “Amani Africa,” which a field exercise to test strategy, operations and tactical performance. Military planners remarked that while Amani Africa was well executed, it exposed critical strategic, operational and tactical gaps. Four of these gaps are described here. First, military planners noted that each peace support operation should have a functioning strategic headquarters. Second, planners noted that collecting and verifying intelligence was an absolute prerequisite for a successful mission, so that troops could adapt to complex changing environments. Third, planners noted that the five sub regions and their respective member states needed better Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) to clearly define roles and expectations. Finally, planners noted that the AU and member states that deploy as part of the African Standby Force need clear bilateral agreements and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that link the AU with the five sub regions. The AU is planning Amani Africa II to be held in Lesotho in October 2014 with a final After Action Review and Exercise Report due in March and May 2015, respectively.

Force Composition: The sub-regions

Each ASF sub-region has either developed or is in the process of developing its own brigade-sized unit and companion civilian and police units. These units are intended to provide personnel, materiel, and funding to the larger continental force. However, each region has developed its forces at a different pace meaning that coordination management, and allocation of responsibilities has been hard to track and assessing progress has been difficult, resulting in an uneven development of the ASF peacekeeping capacity. Eastern, western, and southern regions were early to contribute a brigade-sized unit to overall ASF; however, the northern and central forces have been slower to develop. More importantly, the sub-regions play a critical role and exert influence over the ASF’s general operationalization. Additionally, severe funding shortages means that most sub-regions—with the exceptions of those who have wealthy member states, like Nigeria in the ECOWAS sub-region and South Africa in the SADC sub-region—do not have the material needed to conduct peace support. Additionally, most sub-regions have limited knowledge of conducting peace operations, especially at the senior mission leadership level.

As a result, the likely prospects for deploying a peace operation are reliant upon a handful of powerful member states, like Nigeria and South Africa who have well-developed militaries, superior command and control, and modern military hardware. (In fact, in 1998, Nigeria almost single-handedly managed ECOMOG operations in Sierra Leone with over 90 percent of the ECOMOG force made up of Nigerian soldiers. Thus, a common viewpoint was that ECOMOG was a Nigerian force, not one that was representative of ECOWAS as a sub-region.) To further complicate matters, each sub-region has had different standardisation requirements, which result in discrepancies between member states. As a result, synchronizing training exercises between troop contributors has been difficult. Related to force structure, the AU requires the five sub-regions to provide updated rosters with accurate force contributor numbers.

In the early stages of ASF development, each sub-region contributed between 5,000-6,000 forces to create a combined Continental strength of between 25,000 and 30,000 troops, not including support personnel. Each sub-region has also created a Headquarters, and most have finalized their planning elements (PLANELM) and logistics depot, however, as this research has noted, each sub region is developing at a different pace, thus some are more prepared than others. On the civilian side, the AU requires a civilian roster of (at least) 300 personnel who would be readily deployable with the military component. Of course, police and civilian components are also included to assist in substantive areas like civil affairs, humanitarian affairs, political affairs, human rights, election monitoring, Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR), among other administrative functions.

Force Composition: The ECOWAS Example

Of the five sub-regions, ECOWAS is recognised as having the most advanced and progressive peace and security arrangement of the five African sub-regions, underpinned with a mandate to intervene politically and militarily in one of its member states if there is a serious threat to sub-regional security or if a humanitarian disaster is imminent or if there is a threat to overthrow or attempted overthrow a democratically elected government. ECOWAS also has the right to intervene in situations where the human rights of its citizens have been violated or are being threatened. Operationally, ECOWAS has possessed a more aggressive peace and security stance compared to its sub-regional counterparts and was the first sub-region to deliver a full brigade to the ASF. This is perhaps a consequence of its active peace enforcement activities in Liberia and Sierra Leone and its proactive, yet ad hoc intervention approaches to conflicts in the sub-region. Notwithstanding some criticism, ECOWAS did demonstrate a strong resolve to thwart sub-regional threats rather than wait until violence escalated. For example, From 1990-2003, ECOMOG demonstrated the capacity and willingness to intervene when conflicts erupted in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire even without a clear mandate to guide their efforts. ECOMOG is perhaps remarkable due to the fact that it intervened during a time when states did not typically interfere in the affairs of another state.

ECOWAS was also the first sub-regional organization to adopt humanitarian intervention protocols in fact it developed these well in advance of the AU. In 2005, ECOWAS and the P3 development partners, such as the African Union, The European Union, The United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany and the Netherlands along with the now defunct UN Standby High Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) and the ECOWAS Mission Planning Management Cell created a framework to operationalise a sub regional standby force for the sub-region, which is viewed as a template of sorts for the other subregions. The force is comprised of a rapid reaction “Task Force,” which is a rapidly deployable unit designed to remain in the mission area for up to 90 days without support and a longer sustaining Main Brigade, which would take over from the Task Force. In 2009 and 2010, ECOWAS conducted field-training exercise “Operation Juigi” to test and certify logistics and interoperability. These efforts took place well in advance of the other subregions. One significant outcome of the exercise was that it clarified roles and responsibilities between the Main Brigade and the Task Force and tested scenarios for both rapid reaction and longer-term deployments to see how the two interoperate. If forces were needed for longer than 90 days, ECOWAS provided three options for the Task Force:

Task Force remains deployed as part of the Main Brigade.
Task Force returns a portion of troops to Force Contributing Countries (FCCs) if they are no longer needed.
Task Force integrates troops into an existing African Standby Force (ASF) or UN mission.

Obviously, ECOWAS has a longstanding history of deeply rooted socio-political and cultural differences between Anglophone and Francophone member states, which has resulted in power imbalances and leadership challenges. Indeed, these factors have influenced how force contributors work together, which unquestionably upsets the essential cohesion and collaboration required in an integrated mission. To address these concerns, the AU signed contractual Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) between the AU and its member states to manage expectations between force contributors. However, there has been limited evidence of MOU effectiveness.

Challenges and opportunities for African regional and sub-regional peace operations

The need to swiftly address peacekeeping challenges from within, is critical now more than ever; genocide, war crimes, coups d’états, post election instability,innovations in warfare technology and increased flow of mercenaries and small arms across Africa’s borders have exacerbated the already fragile security environment in Africa. Within the context of current and anticipated conflicts in Africa, evolving norms like the Protection of Civilians and the Responsibility to Protect along with AU and ECOWAS complementary laws of intervention, which codify the right to intervene, have indeed been critical factors in prioritising human security and protect civilians. Since the 1990s, peacekeeping paradigms have unquestionably been transformed for the better. As discussed in this chapter, both the AU and ECOWAS have made significant progress advancing their peace and security architectures at the institutional level and African leaders have demonstrated significant focus on human security challenges. However, the majority of progress to date has been about creating concepts, institutions, and frameworks with less success in operationalization. There remains a need to improve strategic coherence with stronger analytical capacity and communication across the five sub-regions, and to enhance strategic partnerships with outside actors, especially the UN.

Of course, there are both advantages and disadvantages to deploying African regional and sub-regional peacekeepers to African conflicts. In times of crisis, the UN has become more dependent upon regional organizations to conduct peace operations. More broadly, regional organizations can help the UN implement its ambitious mandate to uphold international peace and security and when deployed in conjunction with a UN peace support operation, a regional force can augment an under resourced and over stretched UN mission. Additionally, regional peace support operations likely bring local knowledge and expertise and a stronger resolve to resolve to stop conflicts in their own region, they may be able to bring political capital to facilitate peace operations. Regional forces also tend to be more in tune with the complex cultural, social and political dynamics, which often underlie a conflict.

On a practical level, regional peacekeepers bring local expertise and language skills. In exceptional circumstances, regional forces that have powerful member states may also provide additional equipment and funding, although this is not typical for many African nations. Operationally, regional organizations may also be less encumbered by the logistical and political limitations that are endemic to so many UN peace operations. They also deploy faster than a UN operation, which can typically take between 6-12 months to become fully operational. It is unlikely that a UN led intervention would have fared better in an environment like Liberia. Thus in hindsight, regional operations were perhaps the best course of action at the time as UN interventions during the same time period on a similar scale were mostly ineffective. Two significant examples of the UN’s well-publicized failures are UNOSOM II’s struggle to reconcile Somalia’s fighting clans in 1993-1994 and UNAMIR’s failure to stop the 1994 Rwandan genocide.

Of course, there are also disadvantages to using regional forces to protect civilians in Africa. Lingering political, structural and cultural challenges between Africa’s five sub regions commonly referred to as Regional Economic Communities (RECs) or Regional Mechanisms (RMs) are responsible for implementing the peace and security mandate of the African Union at the sub-regional level and link to the broader African Peace and Security Architecture. The Regional Economic Communities (RECs) include the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMSEA), the Community of Sahel Saharan States (CEN-SAD), the Eastern Africa Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC). The Military sub regions include the East African Standby Force (EASF), the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), the North African Regional Capability (NARC), the SADC Standby Force (SSF) and the Economic Community of Central African States Standby Force (FOMAC or ECCAS) add to an already fractured and complex institutional landscape, exacerbating a culture of mistrust between the Northern, Southern, Eastern and Western sub regions.

Additionally, overlapping economic and military, memberships have led to queries around interoperability and who is responsible for responding to security threats. As evidenced in many of Africa’s crises, conflicts have been trans-boundary, quickly spilling into neighboring countries. In this regard, regional peacekeepers have to address peace and security threats through the lens of Africa’s permeable borders.

Conclusion

Long ago, Confucius wrote ‘…study the past if you would define the future.’ Indeed, history is our greatest teacher. In the realm of regional peacekeeping, attention to planning, resource development, conflict prevention through early warning and incorporating lessons learned are all key to shaping future success in Africa, where an constantly-evolving socio-political environment dictates the security on the ground. Of these, lessons learned is perhaps a timely and critical adjustment, which should be made to capture shortfalls and successes and disseminate them to a wider audience. If the absence of any sort of ‘knowledge management’, mistakes will surely be repeated, which will ultimately affect the credibility and legitimacy of the mission on the international stage. ‘African solutions to African Problems’ can only be achieved when appropriate guidance, planning tools and training mechanisms are in place and used as a comprehensive ‘toolkit;’ one that is continually refined to reflect changing scenarios on the ground. When conducted in partnership with the guidance and support of the UN, regional and national actors, the AU can indeed be a model to follow, particularly if rapid intervention to stop mass violence becomes necessary.

The AU has acknowledged that no single factor has contributed more to Africa’s socio-economic challenges than the prolongation of armed conflicts. As such, the scope and complexity of peace operations essential stop violent outbreaks will require improved processes, protocols and planning with protection included at every stage. Additionally, African regional peacekeeping will require more robust human and financial capacity and clear-cut, practical thought leadership. Perhaps more crucially, the AU and sub-regions will need to improve cooperation and collaboration, to avoid duplication of efforts and squandering resources.

Recommendations

Assertively implement lessons learned and disseminate widely from peace support operations. This will be especially important for sub regions, like ECOWAS, who have a strong history of intervention, with limited analysis of lessons learned. Indeed, a deeper analysis of those lessons learned from early interventions, including experiences, challenges and best practices, would go a long way to inform the refinement of protection strategies in African peacekeeping missions. Capturing rarely told success stories is another positive way to share what works and what does not work.

Provide resources to bolster regional efforts: As is evidenced around the world, particularly in Africa, civilians remain the primary casualties of violent armed conflict. Emerging trends suggest that lower intensity conflicts, such as those resulting from political coups and disputed elections may become the norm in Africa – a fact confirmed in Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Guinea-Bissau and others. Given these emergent trends the international community needs to put more resources behind regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms. In this vein, special considerations should be made to increase the roles of police and civilians to improve cooperation in all five subregions. Include an Early Warning component in all peacekeeping operations: While the AU is slowly incorporating the Protection of Civilians into its peace operations, they should also focus on robust Early Warning mechanisms in tandem with protection efforts to measure conflict and develop appropriate, proportional responses. If Early Warning indicators are in place, early responses could involve an array of measures prior to sending in troops. Both the African Union (CEWS) and ECOWAS (CEWARN) have included early warning mechanisms as part of their broader peace and security architecture. African institutions also need to collaborate with regional and sub-regional stakeholders, civil society, NGOs and others, on conflict prevention and analysis and avoid working in isolation. With better cooperation, between early warning actors the AU Peace and Security Council could catch warning signs in the early stages and make informed recommendations on the best course of action to take. A more thoughtful, proactive, stance that emphasizes prevention is a critical first step to protect civilians.

Improve Joint Planning: Joint planning has been a monumental challenge for the AU and the RECs, perhaps the most challenging to date. On several occasions the UN Security Council has rejected plans for an AU deployment due to information gaps and inadequate planning. When the AU has collaborated with internal departments REC/RMs, or the UN, there have been positive results; two examples are UN-AU collaboration in Somalia and the ECOWAS-AU collaboration in Mali prior to being subsumed into the UN operation. Collaboration can and does work, but positive results cannot be attained without adequate capacity, buy in from member states and external investment in resources to strengthen AU strategic headquarters in Addis Ababa and in the sub-regional planning elements..

Adjust the six mission scenarios: As noted earlier, the six ASF deployment scenarios were developed in 2003 reflecting responses to an outdated model of conflict. Today, conflict dynamics in Africa are rapidly changing, perhaps even more complex since the end of the 1990s. Combating elusive terror networks, stopping piracy, and addressing coups or uprisings from disputed elections and humanitarian disasters require a very different response methodology. For example, a response to piracy or Al-Shabaab in Somalia will differ from a response to tackle Al-Qaeda networks in Mali or Boko Haram in Nigeria or address religious cleansing in the CAR. The AU will need to urgently focus its attention and resources to bolstering capabilities to address new threats.

Improve UN-AU-REC relationships: The form and function of future AU peace operations will be contingent upon the relationship between the AU and its five sub-regions. Notwithstanding, obvious gaps in operational capacity, there are cultural and political disparities, which set the tone for how the regions work together; tensions between the AU and the sub regions and tensions among the five sub regions have always been somewhat fragile – a result of competition over resources and uneven development. As a result, it has been difficult to coordinate peace operations, especially since peace and security protocols have been internalized unevenly by different AU member states. As such, future African operations will demand the AU-REC have a close working relationship, both militarily and politically to respond to conflict situations. Under the current ASF concept, peace operations capabilities are supposed to reside with the RECs/RMS, to be made immediately available to the AU when called upon. However, to date most responses have been lead by powerful member states, such as Kenya and Uganda in Somalia and Nigeria in past ECOWAS interventions. The AU will have to find better ways of working with member states to create a model for deployment that highlights the REC model, versus ad hoc member state responses.

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PROLIFERATION IN THE NUMBER OF PEACE OPERATIONS DEPLOYED TO AFRICA

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