THE ANGOLA LONG WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

The Angolan Civil War followed a long war for Angolan independence from Portugal, 1961-74. Although the civil war would continue until 2002, the primary victory happened as early as 1976. The war was fought between three major political organisations and their respective military wings, the People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA). During the war of independence, there was a rough alliance between these groups as they all shared the core desire for an end to colonial rule. Following the Alvor Agreement (January 1975) that set out Angolan independence in legal terms, the three groups all sort to take power and thus outline the future of post-colonial Angola before the agreement came into force in November 1975.

Interventionism in Angola, the role of ideology

Throughout the Cold War ideology has played a significant but varying role in the decision-making processes and actions of different actors, both domestically and in their foreign relations and policies. Interventionism as a political pursuit was ever present during the Cold War, particularly from the primary actors, the United States and the Soviet Union. Throughout the Cold War there were many incidents of direct and indirect intervention. This essay will, however, focus on one such occurrence, Angola, and the principle reasons of the various actors such as, the USA, USSR, Cuba, China and their reasons for intervening, supporting intervention or not intervening, and as such assess the role that ideology played. Angola Long War

Although individual cases will be examined in more detail, it is important to give an overview of the global situation in the years and decades preceding the intervention stated above, as the global order and balance at the time was integral to movements, developments, and actions taken by different states and groups. Effectively it is impossible to analyse such events in isolation to the general global system.

Following World War Two and the Bretton woods declarations, the global order fell into roughly three camps, a western-oriented US led capitalist order (with exceptions), a Soviet led generally socialist/communist order and a third order of states between these two superpowers that would later formally be termed the Non-Aligned Movement (officially founded in Belgrade, 1961). The Non-Aligned Movement was a direct reaction to the policies, ideologies and principles of the US and USSR, thus it can generally be understood and inferred by examining the principles of the two superpowers.

The US and USSR were formed on very different principles and ideologies, although there are elements of similarity, the core values in their creation are inherently different. They come down to the core beliefs of Communism and Capitalism, but further the differences between a state created on the values of liberty, and social justice. As Westad explains, the US was created on the values of liberty; the support for law and order, morally guided principles, decentralized state power, anti-collectivism, science and rationality, and finally the market. The Soviet state, however, was built built upon the foundation of social justice, a reaction to the Tsarist centuries of serfdom and exploitation. The Bolsheviks thus desired to create a more just, humane society via the liberation of the productive potential of the people, and a movement from peasants to modern workers with rights. The Soviet state thus emphasized collectivism, unions and the overriding position of the Party, they denied the market, whereas the US celebrated it. These core beliefs and the creation of their states and systems led to two very opposing views of modernity that would be crucial to future foreign policy and intervention.

Westad explains that there were two primary forms of modernity championed at the time, a capitalist form and a communal form, hence this is where much of the inter-state rivalry and friction begins in earnest as well as the policy of intervention.

The US model of modernity was based on intensive urban growth via the importation of advanced consumer products and technology as well as joining the global capitalist market and aligning with the world’s’ most powerful state. The USSR model was based on politically induced growth through centralized planning and mass mobilization with an emphasis on heavy industry, massive infrastructural projects, collectivization of agriculture, and independence of international markets. Both forms had their weaknesses and strengths and both offered a road to modernity through education, science and technological progress. The desire to spread their form of modernity and prevent the spread of their rival’s is a key reason for interventionism as a Cold War policy.

Besides this, both states had an unending belief in their natural role in spreading their beliefs, ways of life and ideologies across the globe, Americanism versus the Communist International. As Westad puts it, the “historic American sense of mission” was to see their views on the principles of national independence and human liberty extended on the world scene, hence Wilson’s decision to enter the First World War was primarily due to seeing it as the only way of achieving a “reasonable peace settlement and the reconstruction of the world order”. The Bolsheviks and later the Soviets had a similar view of their role. Lenin saw his revolution as a preparation for other revolutions to come. He argued that the October Revolution would prepare the ground and provide an example of an attainable revolutionary method for the creation of a new, just society. This does not however clarify when intervention would be applicable. In short, Westad argues that American intervention would follow in a situation where the spread of Communism was likely/possible or there was a threat to the American model of modernity being employed. Soviet intervention did not have such a solid foundation as a core state value, Lenin however argued that support, via the Comintern, would be given to any movement opposing colonialism and fighting imperialism.

Lastly, although the key founding ideologies have been stated, it is important to recognize that ideologies changed and were often very flexible, particularly with changing leadership. Stalin very often ignored the core components of Marxism-Leninism in his expansionist ideas and domestic policies. For example, Lenin championed self-determination and minority rights as a core ideology/policy, whereas Stalin aggressively promoted Russo-centric policies. Later Khrushchev’s destalinization proclaimed a different ideology, a return to pre-Stalin fraternal solidarity and comintern, and a genuine belief in the global victory of Communism. After Khrushchev, Brezhnev followed a policy of increased interaction with the west, peaceful coexistence and the belief in détente. Each leader in turn changed the state’s policies and tweaked the ideology and belief system when needed. Much the same happened in the US. Where Eisenhower had often been very accommodating and agreeable with the Soviets, presidents like Reagan were openly hostile, unaccommodating and bullish. Importantly, the fundamental principle that the US was right, with the right model of modernity and political structure, was never challenged or changed by the leadership. Inter-presidential relations between the US and USSR were very important to global intervention, the Nixon-Brezhnev relationship being an obvious example of good relations, leading to a more harmonized, peaceful diplomatic relationship between the two, with a decrease in aggressive, direct, open intervention during the time.

Intervention by the great powers was thus a complex relation of ideology, diplomacy, fear, and reaction, but of course, there are many other factors and many other players.

Angola

Following Angolan independence with the Alvor Agreement in 1975 a civil war erupted in Angola that raged until 2002. The scale of such a civil war is far behind this essay and its intentions. The focus of this essay shall thus be the period from 1974, prior to the Alvor Agreement, until March 1976, when the Soviets deemed the war to be effectively over. Before the Angolan civil war can be discussed, background information on the causes, actors, and situation in Angola in the preceding years and decades must be given to fully understand the context of the war, its factions, and eventually, the reasons for intervention.

Background

The 20^th century saw a huge anti-colonial global push towards decolonization. It affected all of the world’s ‘great` empires, Great Britain in Asia and Africa, France in Asia and Africa, Belgium in Africa, and even Italy in Ethiopia. Empire as a sustainable and moral system was on its last legs. Although this predates the Cold War the decolonization drive cannot be taken without looking at the context of the Cold War. The Cold War global confrontation between the US and the USSR created a unique situation. Asian and African states recognized the weakness of their European colonizers. The European states were effectively subservient to the Cold War divisions and relatively weak following a damaging conflict, the Second World War. The colonized states saw an opportunity to further their cause in a climate that might just be conducive to their aims. Beyond that, they knew that the Cold War superpower search for ever expanding spheres of interest would enable them to find resources, aid, and general instruction in how to overcome their colonial bonds and create a new state, from the superpowers themselves. The superpower policy of détente further outlined and enslaved the European colonial states into the status quo of subservience and limited maneuverability. The collapse of the Portuguese empire in a few short years following the Carnation Revolution, starting with Guinea-Bissau, and then continuing with Angola and Mozambique (George), was a small part in the general global decolonization trend of the 20^th century but within the context of the Cold War and détente. Angola Long War

Previous interventions were exceedingly important not only to the interveners themselves, but to other states witnessing such interventions. For the Angolan context and the various actors involved, two particular interventions have significant importance, the Vietnam War, and the US-Belgian supported coup in Congo, allowing General Mobutu to overthrow, the democratically elected prime minister, Patrice Lumumba, in 1961. Although the actions in Congo would have little direct influence or control on events in Angola (besides prevention of Soviet aid via Congo), they did show to many African states that the US supported dictatorial violent regimes and aided colonial oppressors, in this case the Belgians.

For many African states the US thus effectively became a supporter of the former colonial elites. Vietnam proved incredibly costly for the United States both physically and politically. The human cost of the war in Vietnam was a direct cause for détente and the change in policy away from direct US intervention. It also triggered to an extent the waves of civil unrest witnessed in the United States and played a smaller role in the civil rights movements of the time. More costly in many aspects to the US, Vietnam showed their weakness to defend against communism; the lack of domestic appetite for such interventions, and in the eyes of the USSR showed a political defeat for American political ideologies and values by those of communism. It also proved a distraction for the US to events in Angola, meaning Angola was never a true priority of the US. Due to events in Vietnam, détente and Richard Nixon’s new policy of “police states”, the US would intervene via a proxy, South Africa.

The period of the late 1960’s and early 1970’s saw a somewhat changing of the balance of power globally. The Soviet Union following Sputnik in 1957, and Gagarin in 1961, were still to an extent riding the wave of success of their form of modernity, a fact not unnoticed by African leaders, who now genuinely viewed the Soviet model as a competitor and valid rival to the American model of modernity. In effect, this created a genuine desire for Soviet assistance, infrastructures and model replication at a time when the United States was losing ground and validity globally, and enhanced Soviet belief in intervention (Bennet). Two further factors have significance for the foreign actors with regards to Angola, these being Cuban-Soviet tensions and the Sino-Soviet split. As shall be discussed in more detail, the Cubans were to play perhaps the biggest role of all in Angola, but prior to Angolan intervention, Cuban-Soviet relations had been at a low point since the Cuban Missile Crisis debacle and therefore added another element to a complicated web of interactions that led to Soviet intervention in Angola. The Sino-Soviet split caused direct rivalry in Africa as China and the USSR both sought to assert influence in their quest to be the preeminent socialist state globally. This would cause them to intervene and assist opposing sides in the Angolan Civil War, where ideologically perhaps they should have been united.

Foreign Intervention and Civil War in Angola

The civil war arguably started on the 23^rd of March 1975, when the FNLA attacked the MPLA headquarters in Luanda, believing that Neto, the head of the MPLA, wished to seize power. As the civil war spread, foreign intervention and aid increased. The US backed Holden Roberto’s FNLA and the CIA began supporting him as early as just a week after the Alvor agreement had been signed (Westad, pg 222). Following the fall of Saigon, and FNLA/UNITA failures against the increasingly strong MPLA, the US decided to increase its aid. The creation of operation IAFEATURE by the CIA was intended to change the course of the Angolan Civil War in favour of Holden Roberto via covert aid (Hancock and Wexler). It must also be noted that China also supported the FNLA with supplies, weapons and instructors. Angola Long War

The Soviet Union naturally backed the Marxist leaning MPLA and Neto. Moscow asserted that the MPLA was in a weak position due to the support for UNITA/FNLA form the US and China, they also concluded that the MPLA was the strongest political group and the only real chance for creating a lasting peace in Angola. The USSR initially offered very limited military hardware assistance, as they believed that following MPLA attacks in 1974 that the MPLA was sufficiently strong and organized to repel UNITA and the FNLA with only limited help. They therefore believed that MPLA initial successes would lead to a return to the negotiating table and a peaceful solution. The increase in USSR aid was a result of increased US and Chinese intervention, most notably the CIA supported, American brokered South African invasion of Angola in October 1975. USSR aid was however mostly channeled through a third party, the Cubans, particularly after Congo blocked Soviet transition via Congo and with the global policy of détente preventing large-scale overt intervention.

The Cuban role in the Angolan Civil War via their intervention is perhaps the most significant in terms of the eventual outcome. Since 1961, the Cubans had been providing aid to MPLA in their fight against colonialism. This aid continued and dramatically increased during the Angolan Civil War, in part of their own volition, and in part due to Moscow’s requests after the Congo denial. On August 15 1975, Castro argued for the introduction of Cuban soldiers in a message to Leonid Brezhnev. Fidel Castro had detailed their use, but required transport assistance and help in military command and planning from the USSR. The USSR declined to aid the Cubans with transport and military command and planning as they saw it as risking détente with the US. The Cubans however decided to intervene without Soviet aid, and the first troops arrived in October 1975.

With the MPLA in retreat, controlling less than one quarter of Angola in mid-October 1975, and the South African invasion, the USSR decided in late October to begin aiding Cuba in transporting and coordinating troop movements to and within Angola. Importantly the Soviets viewed the South African invasion as a joint US-South African venture; therefore, the policy of détente was to an extent void. The Cuban soldiers proved vital in turning the tide of the war, particularly in the battle of Quifangondo where Cuban artillery and soldiers repelled an FNLA/South African offensive against Luanda effectively ending Roberto’s FNLA challenge in the civil war. South Africa along with the CIA threw all its weight behind Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA and launched large-scale offenses to retake territory in Angola that had recently been taken by the MPLA. USSR/Cuban intervention thus increased, 12000+ Cuban troops as well as Soviet MIG-21 fighter jets, T-34 tanks and heavy arms, by January 1976. The war once again turned against UNITA and its foreign supporters, culminating in the US senate blocking all funding for CIA covert operations in Angola and the South African withdrawal in December 1975. The withdrawal of US-South African support effectively ended the challenge to the MPLA during the time period of this essay, and African recognition of the MPLA government soon followed. Savimbi recognized that he could not challenge the MPLA with Cuban military power and Soviet military advisors (Westad)

Ideology within intervention

The intervention by the different external actors in Angola had a variety of different reasons, political, ideological, economic, military, as well as being both reactionary and progressive. Here I will outline the different reasons of the different principle actors for intervening in Angola, focusing on Cuba, the USSR, the US, China, and South Africa, and importantly the method of their intervention.

The US intervened covertly in Angola, primarily through its proxy, South Africa, one of Nixon’s so called “policeman states”. The “policeman state” policy was a creation of Nixon’s where powerful regional states would assert influence over other to keep order and development along a path approved by the US (Westad). In the region of southern Africa, South Africa was the US ally and therefore the “policeman state”. The US intervention was based primarily on their belief that the American way, its ideals, focus on liberty and the free market, were the right path to modernity and development for the post-colonial Angola state. Marxism represented everything that was ‘un-American`, and therefore the possibility of it gaining a foothold both in Angola and the southern African region must be prevented. The US Angolan policy must be viewed in the global context.

The US was coming to the end of a catastrophic failure in Vietnam, which highlighted both their weakness and desire in combating global communism. The US viewed losing Vietnam as a significant loss of influence in the region; therefore, they viewed Angola in a similar vain. The fear therefore was the loss of influence and the Soviet filling of the post-colonial vacuum. As Kissinger stated the US “must keep Russians out of Africa”, this is the enduring principle reason for US intervention in Angola, and viewed in the larger context of the Cold War, it shows the US ideological mission to prevent the spread and actively combat communism globally (Westad). The US intervention in Angola was thus highly ideologically motivated but with elements of attempted image redemption and the desire to expand and maintain Africa as a US sphere of influence in the post-colonial era. The method of US intervention is also important for discussion. In Vietnam the US intervened directly and militarily, with devastating effect. The 1960s and 70’s were the peak of anti-military intervention movements in US domestic politics and global politics (Suri). The rise of the US civil rights movements and movements for peace prevented the US from using direct intervention in Angola. Simply put, after Vietnam, direct intervention was unthinkable. In Africa, many states and leaders viewed the US as a continuation of colonial imperialist policy. Direct military intervention was therefore impossible, as it would show the US to be on an ideological mission to control Africa.

It is important to discuss the motivation and reason for South African intervention in Angola. Although generally subservient to the US, South Africa had clear goals and reasons of its own for intervening in Angola. South Africa was at the time under the Apartheid regime of racial segregation. The Apartheid regime had caused them to be somewhat pariah-esque in the global community, shunned by many states and placed under a weapons embargo by the US. Further to this, there was also the rise of African pride, nationalism, and more vocal/organised anti-colonialism, best encapsulated by the African National Congress (ANC), which was vehemently anti-apartheid and white-rule in South Africa.

The ANC had large support in southern Africa and in particular, in Angola and neighbouring states, intervention in Angola would have allowed South Africa to reduce or perhaps even eliminate the ANC and its support, had the intervention been successful. South Africa also wished to expand its “homelands” policy, where regions were segregated along ethnic lines. Securing its northern borders along what is modern day Namibia, would have given them the security to begin this process, and by intervening with the US, they sought to gain US support for this policy. Besides these policies there were other reasons that they intervened in order to gain favour with the US, such as acceleration of the South African nuclear program as well as the removal of Ian Smith in Zimbabwe, who South Africa were staunchly opposed to. South African intervention in Angola was a mixture of self-interest in developments and policies within South Africa and ideological disdain for anti-colonial African movements. Intriguingly, once the US senate blocked US covert aid and assistance, South Africa withdrew. Either the relationship with the US and the gains they hoped to make from them was more important than their ideological opposition to anti-colonialism, or they did not have the strength or ability to defeat the rejuvenated MPLA/Cuban forces.

China’s intervention in Angola was a direct result of the Sino-Soviet split and the resulting rivalry. Both states accused the other of being un-socialist and an affront to global communism. China’s principle decision to intervene in favour of the FNLA against the Marxist MPLA was part of a larger confrontation for the global leadership of the communist movement. In the view of China, Angola represented an opportunity to surpass the USSR as the leader and therefore be in a position to exert its influence in a more far-reaching, global manner. It is difficult to ascertain whether this rivalry amounts to a form of ideological intervention or a simple power tug-of-war for control. Certainly, there were different ideological principles in the USSR and China, but it appears that intervention was more in line with seizing control of the global communist movement than any real desire to spread communism in Africa. This argument is best represented by China’s decision to cooperate with the US in Angolan intervention, which certainly removes any ideological influences from the equation. In this case, Chinese aiding and working alongside the US was in response to friendly US movements towards China and the recognition by the US of Chinese views on Tibet, the Dalai Lama, and Taiwan (Hanhimaki). China was however apprehensive about intervening if the South Africans were involved thus suggesting either an ideological opposition to South Africa or the associated disdain of the African states if seen to be aiding the apartheid regime. Angola Long War

Soviet intervention in Angola was a collection of reaction, Cuban and African pressure, and a desire to carry out geopolitical goals. The USSR offered only limited aid before the South African invasion as they heeded the calls of Julius Nyerere who stated that any direct military intervention would be viewed negatively by most African states as being a form of colonialism (after South African intervention, Nyerere stated his belief that the USSR should not become more involved). Only after the South African invasion did Brezhnev agree to Castro’s calls for Soviet aid in planning, equipment and transport. Brezhnev believed that too much overt aid would violate the principles of détente; however, the South African invasion, viewed by the Soviets as being coordinated by the US, enabled the USSR to more openly intervene as the US violated détente first. In this sense, the USSR policy was reactionary. Détente limited the ideological ambition and motivation, but after this restraint had been lifted, the USSR was free to do what it felt was needed.

There is a debate to the extent of ideology being at the centre of USSR interventionism in Angola. Westad gives the impression that Soviet intervention in Angola was a pragmatic affair that aimed to place the USSR in Africa and create military bases in Angola, and that to an extent the USSR was dragged into the conflict by Cuba and African states repeatedly calling for them to intervene. Westad does however state that ideology played a role, particularly the idea that the soviets were compelled to aid “African liberation and global anti-capitalism” by states such as Congo, Mali, Guinea, Tanzania, and Algeria. Zubok however implies a much more ideological reasoning behind Soviet intervention in Angola, “the USSR acted on the premise that decolonization of the continent (Africa) would be a major blow to world capitalism and a great victory for communism”. Soviet intervention was therefore very ideologically grounded in its desire to defeat capitalism and saw anti-colonialism, much as Lenin did, as a movement logically and ideologically connected to socialism.

Africa during the 20^th century was a tempting ground for Soviet expansion of communist ideals. This idea is reciprocated by the African states themselves. To a large extent, the USSR did not have to impose itself on the MPLA or African states. The movements themselves actively called for Soviet aid and intervention. They had a firm belief that soviet ideology and modernity, particularly in the 1960s following Sputnik and Gagarin, was the correct path and a natural defence against imperialism and American modernity and values that were viewed as being too close to their former European colonizers. As stated by Westad there are strictly pragmatic reasons for Soviet intervention. The Sino-Soviet split and the desire for supremacy of the global communist movement and the desire to show off Soviet power-projection capabilities in the context of the continued Cold War setting. Zubok also puts forward another idea that Brezhnev was keen to advance socialism in a world that was seeing increasingly socialist failures, such as Allende’s Chile and Egypt.

It is difficult to state the true role ideology played in the soviet decision to intervene in Angola. Clearly, ideology played an important role, but at the same time there were significant pragmatic and geopolitical goals that Angola served a purpose for. The troika stated that the USSR had a “moral internationalist agenda” to assist Angola, with Brezhnev going further to say that Angola became a benchmark for “active solidarity”. Thus, it appears that there were genuine ideological reasons for intervention along with significant geopolitical aims. These ideological reasons however were subservient to détente before South African intervention, in this case, détente was likely a restraint on ideological inclination, which once removed enabled more widespread intervention. The 1970’s also saw economic progress for the USSR with the price of oil increasing by 2250%, thus in short, the USSR had the ideological, geopolitical desire to intervene, and the monetary capability to do so. The global policy of détente however would prevent open direct soviet intervention, just as it prevented direct US intervention. The soviets were thus limited to technical aid, transport, and military advisors, with Cuba compromising the bulk of military force on the ground.

Cuba’s desire to intervene is perhaps the most ideologically driven of all the primary actors. Castro stated that Cuba has strong links with Africa due to its colonial past, and in Neto they saw a true ally, which they could support. Cuba had supported the MPLA since 1961; it was evident that it would increase its support during the civil war. The Cuban position was one of true internationalism as evident in the interventions in Congo and Bolivia. There was an ideological belief in the internationalism of socialism. Cuba had little pragmatic reasoning for aiding the MPLA and little to gain geopolitically. Westad does however offer two additional reasons for Cuban intervention, revenge for the Bay of Pigs operation by the US and revenge for the death of Che Guevara at the hands of the Bolivian army/CIA, as well as a desire for Cuban security. Castro argues that revolution in the third world would be a suitable distraction for the US from Cuba and would therefore protect Cuba from US intervention. The evidence suggests that Cuban intervention was primarily ideological, nothing was offered and nothing was asked for. Cuba aimed to inspire revolution and the spread of Communism;

“Cuba as a revolutionary example, as a small country that defied the United States and was willing to help in faraway places without asking for anything in return, was the Cuba that others saw as an inspiration for their homegrown revolutions”.

Further to this, Angola offered both the Soviets and the Cubans a chance to repair their relationship following the debacle of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Angolan intervention united the Cuban and Soviet leaderships into a force for change, with real possibilities and influence on the African continent. As Mikoyan stated, Castro was a “genuine revolutionary” who felt that Cuba had a historic duty in the third world, which was the principle behind their intervention in Angola.

Conclusion

The role of ideology in the key actors shows that ideological influence differed greatly. Virtually all actors had some degree of ideology within their decision making and planning, but it was not always at the forefront of their planning. Angola largely represents the typical nature of the Cold War, which is ideological and geopolitical. The principle Cold War ideology over the prevention of the other from gaining political or military advantage or influence in a region is fundamental to intervention in Angola. The so-called Americanism vs Communism. What is significant about ideology in Angola is the context of détente and its location in sub-Saharan Africa. The context alone explains the apprehension and method, and why Cuba above all others led the way with intervention. Cuba, the USSR, The US, China, and South Africa all acted with ideological elements in their decisions, the key however is that while the US, South Africa, and China had a lot of pragmatic desires, aims, and reasons for their intervention, Cuba and to a lesser extent the USSR had much less in the way of pragmatic aims, thus their intervention was much more ideologically based. However, the point remains that the USSR came into Angola at the insistence of others, and was effectively drawn into it by Cuban movements without their consultation; there is then a limit to Soviet ideology in Angolan intervention.

What is perhaps more important is the trend in African recognition and self-identification with Communist ideals of social justice and anti-imperialism/colonialism. The USSR and Cuba faced repeated calls from various African states and groups, such as the ANC to intervene or aid their cause. The US civil rights movement showed many African states that the United States could not create equality domestically, and with the close proximity to apartheid South Africa, many African states found a source of hope and a road to social justice in the ideology and policies of the Soviet Union and Cuba. There was self-recognition between Africans and civil rights activists in the US. Angola was part of a much broader change in the superpower balance of power and influence globally, where perhaps for the first time, the USSR was beginning to be seen as a desirable model, particularly in the African post-colonial context. The ideology of the African states and MPLA above all is the key to USSR intervention in Angola, as well as Cuban pushing. Without the call and recognition of communist ideals in Africa, the USSR would never have intervened in Angola, as in large part, the pragmatic realism was not sufficient to entice USSR action on a large scale. This identification with Soviet-Cuban and thus Marxist ideology is therefore the underlining key to intervention in Angola, but within a détente context.

Bibliography

Key Texts:

Westad, O E, 2005. The Global Cold War; third world interventions and the making of our times. 1st ed. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Zubok, V M, 2007. A Failed Empire; the soviet union in the cold war from Stalin to Gorbachev. 1st ed. Chapel Hill: The Unviersity of North Carolina Press.

Others

Bennet, A, 1999. condemned to repetition? the rise, fall, and reprise of Soviet-Russian military interventionism, 1973-1996. 1st ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press

George, E, 2005. The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991; From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale. 1st ed. Oxford, UK: Frank Cass.

Gledjeses, P, 1996. Havana’s Policy in Africa, 1959-76: New Evidence from Cuban Archives. COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT, 8-9, 5-8.

Hancock, L and Wexler, S, 2014. Shadow Warfare; The history of America’s undeclared wars. 1st ed. Berkley: Counterpoint Press.

Hanhimaki, J, 2004. The Flawed Architect; Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. 1st ed. New York: Oxford University Press.

Suri, J, 2003. Power and Protest: global revolution and the Rise of Detente. 1st ed. USA: Harvard University Press.

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THE ANGOLA LONG WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

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